

Let us look at some passages from a book very few people are aware exists. This book is entitled *Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Federal Convention* written from the notes taken by Robert Yates, Esq., Chief Justice of New York, and copied by John Lansing, Jun., Esq., late Chancellor of the state, members of that convention, including *The Genuine Information*, laid before the legislature of Maryland in 1787/88, by Luther Martin, Esq., then Attorney-General of the state, and member of the same convention, and the book was published in 1844.

The following passage begins on page 17 and goes to page 27 of that book (this is an address to the Maryland legislature):

“This, Sir, is the substance of the arguments, if arguments they may be called, which were used in favor of the inequality of suffrage. Those who advocated the equality of suffrage, took the matter up on the original principles of government; they urged, that all men, considered in a state of nature, before any government is formed, are equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority to exercise power over another, and thus without any regard to difference in personal strength, understanding, or wealth. That, when such individuals enter into government, they have each a right to an equal voice in its formation, and afterwards have each a right to an equal vote in every matter which relates to their government. That, if it could be done conveniently, they have a right to exercise in person. Where it cannot be done in person, but for convenience representatives are appointed, to act for them, every person has a right to an equal vote in choosing that representative; who is intrusted to do for the whole, that which the whole, if they could assemble, might do in person, and in the transaction of which, each would have an equal voice. That, if we were to admit, because a man was more wise, more strong, or more wealthy, he should be entitled to more votes than another, it would be inconsistent with the freedom and liberty of that other, and would reduce him to slavery.

Suppose, for instance, ten individuals in a state of nature, about to enter into government, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally wealthy, the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong, or ten times as rich; if, for this reason, he is to have ten votes for each vote of either of the others, the nine might as well have no vote as all; since, though the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth would countervail, and set aside all their votes. If this tenth approved of what they wished to adopt, it would be well, but if he disapproved, he could prevent it; and in the same manner, he could carry into execution any measure he wished, contrary to the opinion of all the others, he having ten votes, and the others altogether but nine. It is evident, that, on these principles, the nine would have no will or discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the will and discretion of the tenth; to him they would be as absolutely slaves, as any negro is to his master. If he did not attempt to carry into execution any measures injurious to the other nine, it could only be said, that they had a good master; they would be totally dependent on the will of another, and not

on their own will. They might not feel the chains, but they would, notwithstanding, wear them; and whenever their master pleased, he might draw them so tight as to gall them to the bone. Hence it was urged, the inequality of representation, or giving to one man more votes than another, on account of his wealth, &c., was altogether inconsistent with the principles of liberty; and in the same proportion as it should be adopted, in favor of one or more, in that proportion are the others enslaved. It was urged, that though every individual should have an equal voice in government, yet, even the superior wealth, strength, or understanding, would give great an undue advantages to those who possessed them. That wealth attracts respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with small injuries rather than to engage in an unequal contest; in like manner, superior understanding would give its possessor many opportunities of profiting at the expense of the more ignorant.

Having thus established these principles, with respect to the rights of individuals in a state of nature, and what is due to each, on entering into government, (principles established by every writer on liberty,) they proceeded to show, that States, when once formed, are considered, with respect to each other, as individuals in a state of nature; that, like individuals, each State is considered equally free and equally independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abounding with more inhabitants. That, when a number of States unite themselves under a federal government, the same principles apply to them, as when a number of individual men unite themselves under a State government. That every argument which shows one man ought to not have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger, or wealthier, proves that one State ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous. And, that by giving one State, or one or two States, more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such State or States, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put, of individuals, when one has more votes than the others. That the reason why each individual man in forming a State government should have an equal vote, is because each individual, before he enters into government, is equally free and independent. So each State, when States enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote; because, before they entered into such federal government, each State was equally free and equally independent. That adequate representation of men formed into a State government, consists in each man having an equal voice, either personally, or, if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representatives. So, adequate representation of States in a federal government, consists in each State having an equal voice, either in person or by its representatives, in every thing which relates to the federal government. That this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal, than in a State government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one

part, oppressive to the others, without their suffering in common; but the different States, composing an extensive federal empire, widely distant from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.

They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also appealed to history. They showed, that in the amphictyonic confederation of the Grecian cities, each city, however different in wealth, strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, and each had an equal voice in every thing that related to the common concerns of Greece. It was shown, that in the seven provinces of the United Netherlands, and the confederated cantons of Switzerland, each canton and each province have an equal vote, although there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and extent of territory among these provinces and those cantons, as among these States. It was said, that **the maxim, that taxation and representation ought to go together, was true** so far, that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented, but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom; and therefore all, whether individual States, or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation. **That to those who insist, that he who pays the greatest share of taxes ought to have the greatest number of votes, it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy.** That if one pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government. So if one State pays more to the federal government, it is because, as a State, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages.

It was urged, that, upon these principles, the Pennsylvanian, or inhabitant of a large State was of as much consequence as the inhabitants of Hersey, Delaware, Maryland, or any other State. That his consequence was to be decided by his situation in his own State; that if he was there as free, if he had as great share in the forming of his government, and in the making and executing its laws, as the inhabitants of those other States, then was he equally important, and of equal consequence. Suppose a confederation of States had never been adopted, but every State had remained absolutely in its independent situation, no person could with propriety say, that the citizen of the large State was not as important as the citizen of the smaller; the confederation of the States cannot alter the case. It was said, that in all transactions between State and State, the freedom, independence, importance, and consequence, even the individuality of each citizen of the different States, might with propriety be said to be swallowed up, or concentrated, in the independence, the freedom, and the individuality of the State of which

they are citizens. That the thirteen States are different distinct political individual existences, as to each other; that the federal government is, or ought to be, a government over these thirteen political individual existences, which form the members of that government; and that, as the largest State is only a single individual of this government, it ought to have only one vote; the smallest State, also being one individual member of this government, ought also to have one vote. **To those who urged, that for the States to have equal suffrage was contrary to the feelings of the human heart, it was answered, that it was admitted to be contrary to the feeling of pride and ambition, but those feelings which ought not to be gratified at the expence of freedom.**

It was urged, that the position, that great States would have great objects in view, in which they would not suffer the less States to thwart them, was one of the strongest reasons why inequality of representation ought not to be admitted. If those great objects were not inconsistent with the interest of the less States, they would readily concur in them; but if they were inconsistent with the interest of a majority of the States composing the government, in that case two or three States ought not to have it in their power to aggrandize themselves, at the expence of all the rest. **To those who alleged, that equality of suffrage in our federal government, was the poisonous source from which all our misfortunes flowed, it was answered, that the allegation was not founded in fact; that equality of suffrage had never been complained of by the States, as a defect in our federal system;** that, among the eminent writers, foreigners and others, who had treated of the defects of our confederation, and proposed alterations, none has proposed an alteration in this part of the system; and members of the convention, both in and out of Congress, who advocated the equality of suffrage, called upon their opponents, both in and out of Congress, and challenged them to produce one single instance where a bad measure had been adopted, or a good measure had failed of adoption, in consequence of the States having an equal vote; on the contrary, they urged, that all our evils flowed for want of power in the federal head, and that, let the right of suffrage in the States be altered in any manner whatever, if no greater powers were given to the government, the same inconveniences would continue.

It was denied that the equality of suffrage was originally agreed to on principles of necessity or expediency; on the contrary, that it was adopted on the principles of the rights of men and the rights of States, which were then well known, and which then influenced our conduct, although now they seem to be forgotten. For this, the Journals of Congress were appealed to; it was from them shown, that when the committee of Congress reported to that body the articles of confederation, the very first article, which became the subject of discussion, was that respecting equality of suffrage. That Virginia proposed divers modes of suffrage, all on the principle of inequality, which were almost unanimously rejected; that on the question for

adopting the article, it passed, Virginia being the only State which voted in the negative. That, after the articles of confederation were submitted to the States, by them to be ratified, almost every State's proposed certain amendments, which they instructed their delegates to endeavor to obtain before ratification, and that among all the amendments proposed, not one State, not even Virginia, proposed an amendment of that article, securing the equality of suffrage, - the most convincing proof it was agreed to and adopted, not from necessity, but upon a full conviction, that, according to the principles of free government, the States had a right to that equality of suffrage.

But, Sir, it was to no purpose that the futility of their objections were shown, when driven from the pretence, that the equality of suffrage had been originally agreed to on principles of expediency and necessity; the representatives of the large States persisting in a declaration, that they would never agree to admit the smaller States to an equality of suffrage. In answer to this, they were informed, and informed in terms the most strong and energetic that could possibly be used, that we never would agree to a system giving them the undue influence and superiority they proposed. That we would risk every possible consequence. That from anarchy and confusion, order might arise. That slavery was the worst that could ensue, and we considered the system proposed to be the most complete, most abject system of slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under the pretence of forming a government for free States. That we never would submit tamely and servilely, to a present certain evil, in dread of a future, which might be imaginary; that we were sensible the eyes of our country and the world were upon us. That we would not labor under the imputation of being unwilling to form a strong and energetic federal government; but we would publish the system which we approved, and also that which we opposed, and leave it to the country, and the world at large, to judge between us, who best understood the rights of free men and free States, and who best advocated them; and to the same tribunal we would submit, who ought to be answerable for all the consequences, which might arise to the Union from the convention breaking up, without proposing any system to their constituents. During this debate we were threatened, that if we did not agree to the system proposed, we never should have an opportunity of meeting in convention to deliberate on another, and this was frequently urged. In answer, we called upon them to show what was to prevent it, and from what quarter was our danger to proceed; was it from a foreign enemy? Our distance from Europe, and the political situation of that country, left us but little fear. Was there any ambitious State or States, who, in violation of every sacred obligation, was preparing to enslave the other States, and raise itself to consequence on the ruin of the others? Or was there any such ambitious individual? We did not apprehend it to be the case; but suppose it to be true, it rendered it the more necessary, that we should sacredly guard against a system, which might enable all those ambitious views to be carried into effect even under the sanction of the constitution and government. In fine, Sir, all these threats were

treated with contempt, and they were told, that we apprehended but one reason to prevent the States meeting again in convention; that, when they discovered the part this convention had acted, and how much its members were abusing the trust reposed in them, the States would never trust another convention. At length, Sir, after every argument had been exhausted by the advocates of equality of representation, the question was called, when a majority decided in favor of inequality; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia voting for it; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware against it; Maryland divided.”

On pages 28-32, it says “The States have a right to an equality of representation. This is secured to us by our present articles of confederation; we are in possession of this right; it is now to be torn from us. What security can you give us, that, when you get the power the proposed system will give you, when you have men and money, that you will not force from the States that equality of suffrage in the second branch, which you now deny to be their right, and only give up from absolute necessity? Will you tell us we ought to trust you, because you now enter into a solemn compact with us? This you have done before, and now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you now make an appeal to the Supreme Being, and call on him to guarantee your observance of this compact? The same you have formerly done, for your observance of the articles of confederation, which you are now violating in the most wanton manner.

The same reasons, which you now urge for destroying our present federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system, which you now propose to adopt; and, as the method prescribed by the articles of confederation is now totally disregarded by you, as little regard may be shown by you to the rule prescribed for the amendment of the new system, whenever, having obtained power by the government, you shall hereafter be pleased either to discard it entirely, or so to alter it as to give yourselves all that superiority, which you have now contended for, and to obtain which you have shown yourselves disposed to hazard the Union. Such, Sir, was the language used on that occasion, and they were told, that, as we could not possibly have a stronger tie on them, for their observance of the new system, than we had for their observance of the articles of confederation. Which had proved totally insufficient, it would be wrong and imprudent to confide in them. It was further observed, that the inequality of the representation would be daily increasing. That many of the States, whose territory was confined, and whose population was at this time large in proportion to their territory, would probably, twenty, thirty, or forty years hence, have no more representatives than at the introduction of the government; whereas, the States having extensive territory, where lands are to be procured cheap, would be daily increasing in the number of inhabitants, not only from propagation, but from the emigration of the inhabitants of the other States, and would have

soon double, or perhaps treble the number of representatives that they are to have at first, and thereby enormously increase their influence in the national councils. However, the majority of the select committee at length agreed to a series of propositions, by way of compromise, part of which related to the representation in the first branch, nearly as the system is now published, and art of them to the second branch, securing, in that, equal representation, - and reported them as a compromise, upon the express terms, that they were wholly to be adopted, or wholly to be rejected. Upon this compromise, a great number of the members so far engaged themselves, that if the system was progressed upon agreeably to the terms of the compromise, they would lend it their names, by signing it, and would not actively oppose it, if their States should appear inclined to adopt it. Some, however, in which number was myself, who joined in the report, and agreed to proceed upon those principles, and see what kind of system would ultimately be formed upon it, yet resolved to themselves, in the most explicit manner, the right of finally giving a solemn dissent to the system, if it was thought by them inconsistent with the freedom and happiness of their country. This, Sir, will account why the members of the convention so generally signed their names to the system; not because they thought it a proper one; not because they thoroughly approved, or were unanimous for it, but because they thought it better than the system attempted to be forced upon them . . . it did not appear to me, that either of those illustrious characters, the honorable Mr. Washington or the President of the State of Pennsylvania, was disposed to favor the claims of the smaller States, against the undue superiority attempted by the large States; on the contrary the honorable President of Pennsylvania was a member of the committee of compromise, and there advocated the right of the large States to an inequality in both branches, and only ultimately conceded in the second branch on the principle of conciliation, when it was found no other terms would be accepted. This, Sir, I think it my duty to mention, for the consideration of those, who endeavor to prop up a dangerous and defective system by great names . . . Before the adjournment, I moved for liberty to be given to the different members to take correct copies of the propositions, to which the convention had then agreed, in order that, during the recess of the convention, we might have an opportunity of considering them, and, if it should be thought that any alterations or amendments were necessary, that we might be prepared, against the convention met, to bring them forward for discussion. But, Sir, the same spirit, which caused our doors to be shut, our proceedings to be kept secret, our journals to be locked up, and every avenue, as far as possible, to be shut to public information, prevailed also in this case.”

Further along, starting on page 33 and ending on page 36, gives us this:

“Those who were for two branches in the legislature, a House of Representatives and a Senate, urged the necessity of a second branch to serve as a check upon the first, and used all those

trite and common-place arguments which may be proper and just, when applied to the formation of a State government, over individuals variously distinguished in their habits and manners, fortune and rank; where a body chosen in a select manner, respectable for their wealth and dignity, may be necessary, frequently, to prevent the hasty and rash measures of a representation more popular. But on the other side, it was urged, that none of those arguments could with propriety be applied to the formation of a federal government over a number of independent States; that it is the State governments which are to watch over and protect the rights of the individual, whether rich or poor, or of moderate circumstances, and in which the democratic and aristocratic influence or principles are to be so blended, modified, and checked, as to prevent oppression and injury; that the federal government is to guard and protect the States and their rights, and to regulate their common concerns; that a federal government if formed by the States, as States, that is, in their sovereign capacities, in the same manner as treaties and alliances are formed; that a sovereignty, considered as such, cannot be said to have jarring interests or principles, the one aristocratic, and the other democratic; but that the principles of a sovereignty, considered as a sovereignty, are the same, whether that sovereignty is monarchical, aristocratical, democratical, or mixed; that the history of mankind doth not furnish an instance, from its earliest period to the present time, of a federal government constituted of two distinct braches; that the members of the federal government, if appointed by the States in the State capacities, that is, by their legislatures, as they ought, would be select in their choice, and, coming from different States, having different interests and views, this difference of interests and views would always be a sufficient check over the whole . . . It was urged, that the government we were forming was not in reality a federal, but a national government; not founded on the principles of the preservation, but the abolition or consolidation of all State governments; that we appeared totally to have forgot the business for which we were sent, and the situation of the country for which we were preparing our system; that we had not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of America, considered as individuals; that as individuals, they were all subject to their respective State governments, which governments would still remain, though the federal government should be dissolved; that the system of government we were intrusted to prepare, was a government over these thirteen States; but that, in our proceedings, we adopted principles which would be right and proper, only on the supposition that there were no State governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were, in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature; that, accordingly, the system proposes the legislature to consist of two branches, the one to be drawn from the people at large, immediately in their individual capacity, the other to be chosen in a more select manner, as a check upon the first. It is, in its very introduction, declared to be a compact between the people of the United States, as individuals; and it is to be ratified, by the people at large, in their capacity as individuals; all

which it was said would be quite right and proper, if there were no State governments, if all the people of this continent were in a state of nature, and we were forming one national government for them as individuals; and nearly the same as was done in most of the States when they formed their governments over the people who compose them.

Whereas it was urged, that the principles on which a federal governments over the States ought to be constructed and ratified, are the reverse; that instead of the legislature consisting of two branches, one branch was sufficient, whether examined by the dictates of reason, or the experience of ages; that the representation, instead of being drawn from the people at large, as individuals, ought to be drawn from the States, as States, in their sovereign capacity; that, in a federal government, the parties to the compact are not the people, as individuals, but the States, as States; and that it is by the States, as States, in their sovereign capacity, that the system of government ought to be ratified, and not by the people, as individuals.

It was further said, that, in a federal government over States equally free, sovereign, and independent, every State ought to have an equal share in making the federal laws or regulations, in deciding upon them, and in carrying them into execution; neither of which is the case in this system, but the reverse; the States not having an equal voice in the legislature, nor in the appointment of the executive, the judges, and other officers of the government. It was insisted, that, in the whole system, there was but one federal feature, - the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is, by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said, that this feature was only federal in appearance.”

Further along, starting on page 38 and ending on page 42:

“Viewing it as a national, not a federal government, as calculated and designed not to protect and preserve but to abolish and annihilate the State governments, it was opposed for the follows reasons. It was said, that this continent was much too extensive for one national government, which should have sufficient power and energy to pervade and hold in obedience and subjection all its parts, consistent with the enjoyment and preservation of liberty; that the genius and habits of the people of America were opposed to such a government. That, during their connexion with Great Britain, they had been accustomed to have all their concerns transacted within a narrow circle, their colonial district; they had been accustomed to have their seats of government near them, to which they might have access, without much inconvenience, when their business should require it. That, at this time, we find, if a country is rather large, the people complain of the inconvenience, and clamor for a division of their courts are held, so as to render it more central and convenient. That, in those States, the territory of which is extensive, as soon as the population increases remote from the seat of government, the inhabitants are urgent for the removal of the seat of their government, or to be erected

into a new State. As a proof of this, the inhabitants of western parts of Virginia and North Carolina, of Vermont and the province of Maine, were instances; even the inhabitants of the western parts of Pennsylvania, who, it is said, already seriously look forward to the time when they shall either be erected into a State, or have their seat of government removed to the Susquehanna. If the inhabitants of the different States consider it as a grievance to attend a county court, or the seat of their own government, when a little inconvenient, can it be supposed they would ever submit to have a national government established, the seat of which would be more than a thousand miles removed from some of them?

It was insisted, that government of a republican nature are those best calculated to preserve the freedom and happiness of the citizen; that governments of this kind are only calculated for a territory but small in its extent; that the only method by which an extensive continent like America could be connected and united together, consistent with the principles of freedom, must be by having a number of strong and energetic State governments for securing and protecting the rights of individuals forming those governments, and for regulating all their concerns; and a strong, energetic federal government over those States, for the protection and preservation, and for regulating the common concerns of the State. It was further insisted, that, even if it was possible to effect a total abolition of the State governments at this time, and to establish one general government over the people, it could not long subsist, but in a little time would again be broken into a variety of governments of a smaller extent, similar, in some manner, to the present situation of this continent; the principle difference, in all probability, would be, that the governments so established, being affected by some violent convulsion, might not be formed in principles so favorable to liberty as those of our present State governments. That this ought to be an important consideration to such of the States as had excellent governments, which was the case with Maryland and most others, whatever it might be to persons, who, disapproving of their particular State government, would be willing to hazard every thing to overturn and destroy it. These reasons, Sir, influenced me to vote against two branches in the legislature, and against every part of the system which was repugnant to the principles of a federal government. Nor was there a single argument urged, or reason assigned, which to my mind was satisfactory, to prove, that a good government on federal principles was unattainable; the whole of their arguments only proving, what none of us controverted, that our federal government, as originally formed, was defective, and wanted amendment. However, a majority of the convention hastily and inconsiderately, without condescending to make a fair trial, in their great wisdom decided, that a kind of government, which a Montesquieu and a Price have declared the best calculated of any to preserve internal liberty, and to enjoy external strength and security, and the only one by which a large continent can be connected and united, consistently with the principles of liberty, was totally impracticable; and they acted accordingly."

The Scribe has not had a chance to read this whole book, at the time of writing this. However, based upon the aforementioned, it is irrelevant what else is in the book. The preceding passages demonstrate the seditious and traitorous nature of the majority of the delegates (or deputies) representing the larger states, including the President of the convention, in wanting to destroy the confederation by subjugating the smaller states. The plan was to unlawfully usurp the existing government using their so called celebrity status to wrongfully influence the uninformed, and then get the uninformed people within the states to commit treason against the existing government by ratifying the Constitution for the United States.

As was mentioned, the conventioners clearly *“appeared totally to have forgot the business for which they were sent”*, as is specified by the Congressional Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787. This, the conventioners blatantly violated. Besides violating this Resolution, their actions were seditious in their approving a method to usurp the existing government by an unlawful process. Then, again, by using their celebrity status, were able to convince the uninformed feeble masses to form their state conventions and approve the ratification process, and thus, making those uninformed people commit treason against the existing confederation, and eventual slaves to the new form of government, which also enslaved their states.

So now you know why the convention had so much secrecy surrounding it. As a collective, they were committing sedition and treason against the lawful government. This coincides with the quotes of George Washington, paraphrased as *“Do not ask my about the legality of the Constitution”* and *“The first time in history that a government has changed hands without bloodshed”*.